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ESSAYS 
RADICALLY SUBVERSIVE SPEECH AND 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 
Steven D. Smith* 
This essay attempts to use a familiar, relatively concrete consti-
tutional question to think about a familiar, relatively abstract juris-
prudential question - and vice versa. The constitutional question 
asks why we should give legal protection to what I will call "radi-
cally subversive speech." The jurisprudential question concerns the 
ancient problem of the legitimacy or authority of law in general. 
"What is law," as Philip Soper puts the question, "that I should 
obey it?"1 I will try in this essay to show that the abstract question 
sheds light on the more concrete one - and vice versa. 
I emphasize that my object is not to provide a thorough review 
of either the problem of subversive speech in relation to free speech 
theories or the large literature concerned with legal authority.2 My 
interest, rather, is in exploring one aspect of the intersection of 
these problems. Because the discussion considers two problems at 
once, it does not proceed in linear fashion to a unitary conclusion 
that can usefully be stated in advance. Instead, its method is to 
start by looking at - but not attempting to resolve - one problem, 
then to consider the other problem, and finally to circle back on 
itself in the end. 
I. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF RADICALLY SUBVERSIVE SPEECH 
Start with the narrower question. "Radically subversive 
speech," in this discussion, will refer to speech that challenges gov-
ernment at the core by denying the very legitimacy of the existing 
legal order. This kind of speech does not argue that the govern-
ment has erred in adopting this or another particular policy or that 
some discrete feature of the existing political regime is unjust or ill-
* Byron R. White Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1976, 
Brigham Young; J.D. 1979, Yale. - Ed. A version of this essay was given as a faculty collo· 
quium at the University of Michigan Law School. I thank friends and colleagues at Colorado 
and Michigan for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAw 7 {1984). 
2. For a valuable overview and assessment of free speech theories, see FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY {1982). For helpful general treat-
ments of the problem of legal authority, see KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND 
MORALITY (1987), and SOPER, supra note 1. 
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advised. It argues, rather, that the government itself is fundamen-
tally illegitimate and should be repudiated or overthrown. 
It is not easy to cite unadulterated examples of radically subver-
sive speech. In part, that is because most speech is complicated, 
containing various and perhaps conflicting layers and dimensions of 
meaning. In part, the difficulty is also due to the fact that speakers 
typically do not craft their messages to fit legal or theoretical cate-
gories; indeed, insofar as the categories define exceptions to consti-
tutional protection, prudent speakers might craft their messages so 
as not to fit those categories.3 What one can say with confidence, 
though, is that there is a discernible range of political discourse that 
government regulators operating in tense or troubled times may 
sincerely regard as radically subversive speech, and they may class-
ify the speech as such in decisions about whether it should be le-
gally protected. 
Indeed, our free speech tradition has been shaped in a series of 
encounters with speakers - anarchists, radical labor agitators, war 
resisters, and communists - who were understood, fairly or not, as 
advocating just this kind of subversive message.4 Those historical 
encounters tended to produce two things: decisions upholding re-
strictions on speech and dissents containing eloquent and passion-
ate free speech rhetoric.5 In the long run, it seems that the dissents 
have proven more powerful than the decisions,6 as the Supreme 
Court's recent flag desecration rulings refiect.7 For the moment, 
3. For example, when members of the Nazi party applied for a permit to march and carry 
placards in Skokie, Illinois, they indicated that their message would be "White Free Speech," 
"Free Speech for the White Man," and "Free Speech for White America." Collin v. Smith, 
578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). This message, in contrast 
with other aspects of the Nazis' philosophy that they might have emphasized, reduced the 
possibility that their message would fit into categories of potentially unprotected speech such 
as "group libel" or "fighting words." 
4. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 {1919) (anticonscription, antiwar, and 
anticapitalist literature); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (antiwar speech by lead-
ing Socialist); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (pro-Russian Revolution leaflet 
opposing U.S. military action); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ("Left Wing Mani-
festo" advocating "Communist Revolution" and "revolutionary Socialism"); Whitney v. cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Communist organizing activity); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951) (conspiracy to promote communism and to advocate overthrow of the 
government). 
5. All of the decisions listed in the previous footnote upheld speech regulations. 
Holmes's dissents in Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624, and Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672, and Brandeis's 
opinion, though technically a concurrence but in substance a dissent, in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 
372, have proven especially memorable. 
6. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is usually regarded as a turning point in the 
movement toward broader protection of radical speech. 
7. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding the Flag Protection Act of 
1989 unconstitutional because it suppresses expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding a Texas statute criminalizing 
the desecration of the flag unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who burned the flag as 
a means of political protest). · 
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though, I intend not to side with either the decisions or the dissents 
but merely to frame the far from novel claim that radically subver-
sive speech presents special obstacles, both practical and concep-
tual, for free speech theories. 
The problem with such speech arises partially because the objec-
tive it ostensibly aims to achieve - the subversion of the existing 
government - may seem an especially catastrophic evil. Speech 
that attacks or threatens things the existing political order holds 
dear may be troublesome enough, but speech that threatens the 
political order itself raises the stakes to another level of magnitude. 
Hence, early decisions reasoned that, under a balancing test, the 
Constitution should permit speech regulations designed to prevent 
such a political overthrow even if the actual prospect of an over-
throw was remote.s 
Standing alone, however, this "balancing" argument does not 
identify the central problem radically subversive speech poses. It is 
possible, after all, that the existing legal order is or may become 
oppressive and illegitimate. If that is so, then speech exposing the 
illegitimacy of government would be true, and if such speech suc-
ceeded in bringing the illegitimate regime to an end, it seemingly 
would have achieved an especially valuable political good. In this 
vein, Holmes conceded, "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the domi-
nant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is 
that they should be given their chance and have their way."9 
Nor is this concession purely artificial. We can identify histori-
cal examples of oppressive political regimes - the Third Reich, for 
instance - whose fall we regard as desirable and just. It is conceiv-
able that our own government might be or become such a regime. 
So if radically subversive speech threatens to produce a cata-
strophic evil, that risk arguably must be balanced against the possi-
bility that it could produce a singularly important political good -
if, that is, the subversive message declaring the illegitimacy of gov-
ernment is true. 
But the qualifier points to the more basic problem: radically 
subversive speech is not true. Rather, it is demonstrably "false" -
in a special sense. To be sure, free speech theorists tend to be wary 
of "true" and "false"; indeed, they may insist that we can never be 
finally sure what is true and what is false and that this is precisely 
the reason that we must always keep the free "marketplace of 
ideas" inviolate.10 But in contrast to the broad array of statements 
uttered in public and private discourse, the truth or falsity of which 
8. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509-11; Git/ow, 268 U.S. at 667-70. 
9. Git/ow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
10. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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is independent of any theory of free speech, there will be a few 
notions that any given theory must itself presuppose and thus neces-
sarily accept as true. Ideas incompatible with these necessary 
premises or presuppositions are, by implication, false. 
This incompatibility is most obvious in the case of radically sub-
versive speech that denies the value of free speech. This sort of 
denial will necessarily be in conflict with any theory affirming the 
value of free speech - which is to say that relative to the premises 
of any theory of free speech, this sort of radical claim will be false. 
In this vein, Larry Alexander notes that "freedom of speech cannot 
rely on the search for truth as its basis for tolerating advocacy of the 
repeal of freedom of speech."11 
But the necessary falsity of radically subversive speech is not 
limited to radical claims that may deny the value of free speech. In 
various ways, even radical claims that attack the legitimacy of the 
government without explicitly denying the value of free speech will 
run afoul of necessary premises of free speech theories. Consider, 
for example, the "democracy" rationale, which in one version or 
another informs much free speech thinking. The core idea of this 
rationale is that our political community is founded on a commit-
ment to democratic government, and democratic government is 
possible only when citizens are free to speak their minds on polit-
ical issues. Within this theory, "truth" comes to have a special 
meaning. Robert Bork explained his version of the theory: 
Truth is what the majority thinks it is at any given moment precisely 
because the majority is permitted to govern and to redefine its values 
constantly. "Political truth" ... has no unchanging content but refers 
to the temporary outcomes of the democratic process. Political truth 
is what the majority decides it wants today. It may be something en-
tirely different tomorrow ... .12 
Under this view, most ideas are, at least as far as free speech 
theory is concerned, at least potentially "true"; they might at some 
point gain the support of a democratic majority. Hence, "there is 
no such thing as a false idea."13 But this pronouncement is too 
broad. By the logic of the democracy rationale itself, there is one 
kind of idea that is demonstrably false - that is, an idea that con-
tradicts the very logic of the democracy rationale by asserting that 
democratic government is illegitimate and hence that democracy is 
11. Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 763, 766 (1993). 
12. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
30-31 (1971). Bork's position, and the democracy rationale in general, create a number of 
conundrums that need not be considered here. For a discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Skepti-
cism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 669-75 
(1987). 
13. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
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not the test of "political truth." Bork drew the natural inference: 
"Speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government" should 
not be protected, he reasoned, because "[v]iolent overthrow of gov-
ernment breaks the premises of our system concerning the ways in 
which truth is defined, and yet those premises are the only reasons 
for protecting political speech."14 
Similar problems may exist, though in more veiled fashion, with 
respect to other rationales for free speech, such as the "marketplace 
of ideas" rationale or the "self-realization" rationale.1s A premise 
implicit in any free speech rationale is that speech is for some rea-
son entitled to a degree of legal protection; a theory of free speech 
must affirm at least that much in order to be a constitutional theory 
of free speech. Another necessary notion of free speech, it seems, 
is that there is a regime or legal order with at least enough authority 
to grant legal protection to speech. It is hard to see how any consti-
tutional defense of free speech could decline to accept these prem-
ises and still be a theory of free speech. Radically subversive 
speech, however, contradicts these essential premises. Conse-
quently, one might argue that a theory of free speech is logically 
committed to the conclusion that radically subversive speech is false 
- "false," that is, not "objectively" or in the abstract, but as mea-
sured by the premises or necessary presuppositions of the theory of 
free speech.16 
Confronted with the claim that radically subversive speech is 
"false," proponents of the prevailing view might respond, following 
Mill, that even false speech is valuable because of "the clearer per-
ception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision 
with error."17 Ultimately, I will argue for an unorthodox variant of 
this view. For now, it is enough to note that although the conten-
tion that false ideas have value is not implausible, neither is it espe-
cially compelling. One may concede that even falsehoods have 
some positive value and yet doubt that this benefit will always, or 
even usually, outweigh the harm and error caused by false 
expression. 
14. Bork, supra note 12, at 31; see also Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 
1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 188-89 
(1956). 
15. The "marketplace of ideas" rationale justifies free speech by asserting that truth will 
emerge when all ideas are spoken and exchanged. The "self-realization" rationale justifies 
free speech by insisting that it is necessary for individual freedom and self-understanding. 
For a full discussion of these and other familiar rationales, see SCHAUER, supra note 2. 
16. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 194 ("(I]f freedom of speech is justified by its relation-
ship to the legal system, and especially if it is justified by its ability to ensure the functioning 
of a system of laws, then speech directed at weakening or destroying that legal system would 
appear to have little claim to protection."). 
17. JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTI 21 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) {1859). 
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Changing the context slightly to make the question less abstract, 
imagine that you are the victim of vicious slander and that the ugly 
lies spread about you are ultimately shown to be baseless. How 
much comfort will you derive from the observation that the truth -
the truth, that is, of your virtue or integrity - shines out even more 
brightly now that it can be contrasted with the obnoxious false-
hoods perpetrated by your defamer? The logic suggests that you 
should be grateful to your defamer for a benefit conferred or per-
haps that the defamer has at least a moral claim upon you for serv-
ices rendered. The improbable quality of these implications 
underscores the obvious conclusion: the positive value of falsehood 
is a value that we would often prefer to do without.ls That conclu-
sion seems to hold for radically subversive speech, as the case law 
and history noted earlier amply attest. 
Even if this analysis is sound, of course, conventional free 
speech wisdom is apt to counter that although radically subversive 
speech might "in theory" or "in principle" be undeserving of the 
legal protection afforded other kinds of speech, it should nonethe-
less be given that protection on more prudential grounds. These 
prudential grounds would likely include the difficulty of identifying 
radically subversive speech and extracting it from other, more valu-
able speech, or "slippery slope" concerns, or fears of governmental 
error and overreaching if a category of speech is left unprotected.19 
The present discussion is not calculated to foreclose this conclusion; 
indeed, I will later suggest that there is a good theoretical rationale 
for resisting the temptation to suppress subversive speech. So the 
present point is, I repeat, a modest one. I suggest only that the case 
for protecting radically subversive speech encounters special, 
weighty objections that go beyond those that trouble free speech 
theory in general because such speech challenges the very premises 
of free speech or the regime that protects it. 
I will return to the problem of radically subversive speech. At 
this point, with apologies, I must abruptly change the subject by 
raising a different and broader question: How can law have 
authority? 
II. THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Many legal philosophers have held that "authority" and "obliga-
tion" are qualities essential to law - that a "law" that can claim no 
authority is not really law at all. Joseph Vining asserts that "[t]hat 
18. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 771 {1976) ("Untruthful speech ... has never been protected for its own sake."). 
19. For an argument to this effect, see Lillian R. Be Vier, The First Amendment and Polit-
ical Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 322-
31 {1978). 
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which evokes no sense of obligation is not law. It is only an appear-
ance of law .... "20 Even legal positivists may acknowledge the 
centrality of "authority" to law. H.L.A. Hart, an avowed positivist, 
criticized John Austin's jurisprudence on just these grounds. Austin 
had defined positive law as a "command of a monarch or sovereign 
number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its au-
thor."21 But if law is no more than this, Hart objected, then there is 
no difference, except in scale, between "the law" and a mugger's 
command of "give me your money or I'll kill you." Austin's positiv-
ism, in other words, could not account for our sense that though the 
mugger's order "obliges" us to obey, "the law" does more than that: 
it "obligates."22 
But what is the nature or basis of law's "authority," if it has any? 
This perennial question can be viewed as having both conceptual 
and factual aspects. The conceptual problem concerns the condi-
tions that must be met in order for law to have authority. This 
problem invites a theoretical response detailing what law would 
need to have or be in order to impose obligations on citizens. The 
factual question asks whether these theory-based conditions obtain 
in reality. This question seemingly calls for a more empirical re-
sponse. But of course the theorist or legal philosopher cannot just 
ignore the factual question because he is probably interested in con-
sidering not only whether some imaginary legal order could have 
authority but whether the existing legal order does have authority. 
So although the conceptual and factual issues are distinguishable, 
they must be considered in conjunction with each other. 
Over the centuries, the question of law's authority has elicited a 
variety of answers - sometimes, as in the cases of Socrates and 
Daniel, from people who had more than an academic interest in the 
question. For present purposes, though, it should be sufficient to 
consider the orthodox account that legal authority must be based 
on the consent of the governed and two noteworthy alternatives to 
that account. Then this essay will point to an account of legal au-
thority that is a sort of composite, though in one important respect 
essentially different from those previously considered. 
A. Consent 
The orthodox democratic view maintains that political and legal 
authority must somehow be grounded in "consent." It is "self-
evident," the Declaration of Independence asserts, that 
"[g]overnments are instituted among Men, deriving their just pow-
20. JosEPH VINING, FROM NEwroN's SLEEP 34 (1995). 
21. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF 
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 134 (3d ed. 1954). 
22. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 6-7, 18-20 (1961). 
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ers from the consent of the governed. "23 A similar view is regarded 
as almost axiomatic in much modem constitutional discourse.24 So 
a law has authority only if it or the government that enacted it was 
somehow consented to by those subject to the law. 
This general answer to the conceptual question immediately 
provokes an obvious and troubling factual question: Have we as 
citizens consented to the prevailing legal order, and if so, how? The 
challenge raised by this question can to some extent be parried by 
tinkering with the concept of "consent." The standard moves are 
familiar. Consent, for example, may be extended to include "tacit 
consent" and "implied consent."25 At some point, however, this 
conceptual tinkering becomes exhausted: the ostensible consent 
becomes so remote or so "constructive" that it seems purely pretex-
tual. Perhaps it is implausible or simply false to say that the unwill-
ing conscriptee drafted to serve in a foreign war has "consented" to 
the draft law in any even minimally meaningful sense.26 
This conclusion is unsettling because it throws in doubt the au-
thority of the whole legal order. Few of us consent in any explicit 
and specific way to any particular statute or regulation, and few of 
us consent consciously, deliberately, or formally to "law" or the 
legal order in general. If we consent at all, we normally do so very 
indirectly - by voting in elections, perhaps, or by accepting some 
of the benefits of citizenship, or by staying in the country rather 
than renouncing our citizenship and leaving. We consent, in other 
words, in the same loose and less than fully voluntary way that the 
conscriptee "consented" to the draft law. If the conscriptee's ac-
tions were not truly consent and hence not a basis for saying that he 
was "obligated" to obey the draft law, then few of us have any con-
sensual obligation, it may seem, to obey any specific laws that we 
happen not to like. Ronald Dworkin explains: "Consent cannot be 
binding on people ... unless it is given more freely, and with more 
genuine alternate choice, than just by declining to build a life from 
nothing under a foreign fiag."27 
If this conclusion seems unacceptable, we may simply choose to 
insist, through clenched teeth, that we - including the conscriptee 
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
24. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 9 (1960) ("Governments, 
we insist, derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. If that consent be lack-
ing, governments have no just powers."). Rogers Smith maintains that one element of "the 
course of America's constitutional development" has been an "expanding legal emphasis on 
consent as the sole source of political legitimacy." ROGERS M. SMITii, LmERAUSM AND 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (1990). 
25. For a careful analysis of these issues, see GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 62-93. 
26. For a critical analysis rejecting arguments that base legal authority on consent or 
promise, see SOPER, supra note 1, at 65-67. 
27. RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 192-93 (1986). 
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- do consent in the necessary sense to all duly enacted laws, in-
cluding the draft law. Or, in the alternative, we might seek some 
basis other than "consent" for law's authority. It will thus be help-
ful to consider two leading contemporary legal theorists who have 
followed this alternate path. 
B. The Need for Coordination 
According to John Finnis, authority arises from the necessity of 
social coordination combined with the power of an individual or 
institution to provide that coordination.28 A community requires 
some sort of coordinating authority in order to function and to pro-
mote the common good; it needs some person or institution to say 
when to set the clocks forward, which side of the road to drive on, 
how long insiders must hold shares before selling them, and when 
to arm and assemble for war - in short, how to behave in the 
whole host of matters, trivial or momentous, in which the absence 
of central direction would prevent citizens from working together 
efficaciously in the pursuit of their common interests. The need for 
coordination is not merely an unfortunate consequence of human 
ineptitude and wickedness; on the contrary, "the greater the intelli-
gence and skill of a group's members, and the greater their commit-
ment and dedication to common purposes and common good ... 
the more authority and regulation may be required, to enable that 
group to achieve its common purpose, common good."29 The ne-
cessity of coordinating direction can justify legal authority, Finnis 
maintains, without any appeal to "[c]onsent, transmission, contract, 
[or] custom."30 
Finnis is surely correct in pointing to the social value - indeed, 
the social necessity - of a coordinating authority, and the point is 
one that we will return to more than once. But the fact that we 
need something does not normally ensure that we have it or even 
that the thing exists at all. I may need a meal, or a job, or a loyal 
friend, but it does not follow that I have any of these things. Simi-
larly, need alone seems impotent to generate legal authority. Bos-
nia and Beirut need legal authority, desperately. Any destructive 
civil war underscores the social necessity of legal authority - and 
the insufficiency of necessity alone to create such authority. 
In order to give rise to authority, therefore, Finnis explains that 
effective power must supplement social need. Authority, in other 
words, is the product of a need for social coordination plus the 
power or ability of a person, group, or institution to provide such 
28. The following discussion is distilled from JoHN FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS 231-59 (1980). 
29. Id. at 231. 
30. Id. at 248. 
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coordination.31 So the threat or the reality of social chaos resulting 
from, say, the French Revolution does not by itself confer authority 
on Napoleon. What confers that authority is the combination of the 
threat of social chaos and Napoleon's ability to provide relief from 
that chaos. Authority is lodged in Napoleon by virtue of "the sheer 
fact of [his] effectiveness."32 
Finnis's account avoids the need to hypothesize any fictional 
contract or consent, and in its recognition of the role of power, it 
displays a sense of realism sometimes missing in academic discus-
sions of authority.33 Despite these virtues, Finnis's formulation -
social necessity plus effective power - provokes a serious objec-
tion. The problem now is not that the formulation is wrong but 
rather that in the typical situation, it begs the central question. 
What, after all, is the source of Napoleon's, or Lenin's, or Con-
gress's power? Why is it that "the say-so of [these people] ... will 
in fact be, by and large, complied with"34 thus enabling them to 
provide social coordination? It is surely implausible to suppose that 
these or most other governors could, through unaided physical 
force or personal charisma or moral suasion, exact compliance with 
their decrees. Indeed, the typical ruler or government official may 
not be especially well endowed with any of these qualities, and it 
would not be either incoherent or unusual for citizens of a commu-
nity to ascribe legal authority to one individual or group while at 
the same time maintaining that other individuals and groups have 
greater physical strength, wisdom, virtue, rhetorical skill, or 
charisma. 
So what is the source of the ruler's power? Typically, a ruler's 
power, to a large extent, lies precisely in the fact that his subjects 
believe he possesses legal authority. But this acknowledgment 
would seem to render Finnis's requirement of effectiveness or 
power circular and useless. A person has authority, we are told, if 
she has power to provide social coordination, but a person has 
power to provide social coordination if and because she has author-
ity. So the central question remains unanswered. What is it that 
confers authority on particular people in the first place, thus giving 
them power to provide social coordination? 
31. See id. at 246-47. 
32. Id. at 247. 
33. Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 161-62 (observing that one feature of a natural Jaw 
theory of authority such as Finnis's is "its 'realism' about the origins and survival of actual 
political authorities"). 
34. FINNis, supra note 28, at 246. 
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C. The Community of Principle 
At this point, it will be helpful to leave Finnis's account tempo-
rarily and turn to another legal theory that, like Finnis's, does not 
rely on "consent" as the basis of legal authority. Whereas Finnis 
tries to squeeze authority out of social necessity, Ronald Dworkin 
seeks to ground it in a particular kind of political community. Legal 
authority, he explains, is not based on the "consent" of the gov-
erned35 but rather on a collective commitment to "principle": legal 
obligations can arise only from and within a "community of princi-
ple. "36 In order to merit that designation, a community must meet 
stringent requirements. In particular, its citizenry must "accept that 
their fates are linked in the following strong way: they accept that 
they are governed by common principles, not just by rules ham-
mered out in political compromise."37 Thus, political and legal de-
cisions cannot merely reflect public choice bargains or compromises 
among competing interest groups. Those kinds of decisions would 
carry no authority; they would not be fully "law." Instead, govern-
ment must act on "a single, coherent set of principles."38 Only if it 
does so can its law impose obligations on citizens. 
Whether Dworkin's account satisfies the conceptual require-
ments for a plausible theory of authority is debatable. Imagine that 
you are Henry David Thoreau.39 The tax collector answers your 
objections by explaining that contrary to your initial supposition, 
the war in Texas and the taxes required to support that war are not 
the product of political compromise. On the contrary, there is a 
coherent set of principles that can consistently account for the war, 
the tax, and the constitutional order generally. Is your answer, "In 
that case, here's my money," or, "So what-with all due respect for 
your ingenuity, the war's still wrong"?40 
Suppose, though, that Dworkin's account is conceptually satisfy-
ing. Those inspired by his vision of community still must consider 
an unpleasant consequence: it seems that our own community fails 
as a matter of hard fact to qualify as a "community of principle." 
Most laws and political decisions in this country are quite clearly 
products of political compromise. For those who find political 
35. DwoRKIN, supra note 27, at 192-93. 
36. Id. at 195-216. 
37. Id. at 211. 
38. Id. at 166. 
39. See Henry David Thoreau, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, reprinted in LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 25 (R. George Wright ed., 1992). 
40. Of course, if Thoreau accepts the principles that justify the war, one might expect that 
he would support it. But it would be plainly unrealistic to suppose - and Dworkin does not 
assume - that all actual citizens will agree with the governing "single, coherent set of 
principles." 
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horse trading and compromise unseemly, the taint goes all the way 
down - to the Constitution and the Philadelphia Convention.41 
Consequently, our own law would seem to lack authority. 
Moreover, a similar diagnosis seems likely for any large and hetero-
geneous democratic community subsisting anywhere outside our 
imaginations. So it may seem that in seeking to shore up the au-
thority of law, Dworkin has effectively destroyed it. 
D. The Construction of Fictional Authority 
But this conclusion would be premature. No doubt Dworkin 
knows perfectly well that the quarrelsome, pluralistic citizenries 
that make up the United States, or the United Kingdom, or any 
other modem state do not constitute "communities of principle" as 
he has described them. He suggests, however, that this deficiency 
can be remedied by thinking "as if a political community really 
were some special kind of entity distinct from the actual people 
who are its citizens."42 And this "as if" community might always 
act on a single, coherent set of principles, even though the flesh-
and-blood citizens who make up the actual communities from 
which the "as if" community is abstracted plainly do not. 
Dworkin is explicit in pointing out that this way of thinking 
about a community, which he calls "personification," involves an 
imaginative or constructive effort on our part. The "as if" commu-
nity is not in reality a person; nonetheless, we can choose to think 
of it as if it were one. "[I]t is still a personification not a discovery, 
because we recognize that the community has no independent meta-
physical existence, that it is itself a creature of the practices of 
thought and language in which it figures."43 In short, the authority 
of law is wholly dependent on what plainly is, and what Dworkin 
quietly acknowledges to be, a fiction. 
It is tempting - but it would also be unwise - to reject Dwor-
kin's account of authority out of hand on the ground that the "com-
munity of principle" is nothing but a transparent academic 
fabrication. We should recall, however, that "legal fictions" are a 
perfectly familiar, if somewhat controversial, feature of legal think-
ing.44 Some of our most venerated political philosophers - Locke, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau - have grounded political authority in a 
41. See JOHN P. Room, SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE: EssAYS ON THE THEORY AND 
STRUCTURE OF Pouncs 91-126 (1964). 
42. DwoRKIN, supra note 27, at 168 (emphasis added). 
43. Id. at 171 (emphasis added). 
44. For a thoughtful discussion of the value and limits of legal fictions, see LoN L. 
FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). For a more skeptical analysis objecting to the common use 
of fictions, see Peter Birks, Fictions Ancient and Modern, in THE LEGAL MIND 83 (Neil Mac-
Cormick & Peter Birks eds., 1986). 
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"social contract" whereby individuals agree to confer upon the state 
all or some powers and rights that they had previously held while in 
a "state of nature." This "contract" is surely neither a historical fact 
nor a present reality, and it must therefore be regarded as a useful 
fiction. 
Indeed, many centuries earlier, Socrates explained his obliga-
tion to obey the laws of Athens, including the unjust decree requir-
ing his own execution, by personifying the polity in a way that at 
least resembles the kind of thinking Dworkin recommends.4s In 
Plato's account, "the laws" actually appear as a person and engage 
Socrates in conversation.46 This personification is not a superfluous 
literary device; rather, it enables Socrates, or Plato, to separate "the 
laws" from the Athenian multitude that Socrates argues, in the very 
same dialogue, is not entitled to respect or obedience.47 In employ-
ing a fiction at the foundation of his theory, therefore, Dworkin 
arguably is carrying on a long and honorable tradition in political 
and legal philosophizing. 
Nor is Dworkin the only contemporary legal thinker to tie legiti-
mate authority to a fiction. John Rawls's "original positioµ"48 is not 
and could not be presented as a historical condition or occurrence. 
Bruce Ackerman locates constitutional authority in "We the Peo-
ple,"49 but Ackerman's "the People" seems abstract and idealized, 
unnaturally integrated and abnormally self-conscious - manifestly 
distinct from the temporally and cognitively limited, flesh-and-
blood mortals who fought about and then supported the Revolu-
tion, the Constitution, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the 
New Deal. 
"We the People," in short, is a fictional construction.50 Nor is 
Ackerman the original author of that fiction; John Marshall, for 
one, has a prior claim.51 James Boyd White observes that we "think 
45. Plato, Crito, reprinted in LEGAL AND PoLmCAL OBLIGATION: CLASSIC AND CON· 
TEMPORARY TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 1, 7-11 (R. George Wright ed., 1992). 
46. Id. at 7-11. 
47. Id. at 2, 4-5. 
48. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
49. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TIIE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
50. Ackerman sometimes suggests as much. For example, in discussing "the Bicentennial 
Myth," Ackerman observes that "the narrative we tell ourselves about our Constitution's 
roots is a deeply significant act of collective self-definition; its continual re-telling plays a 
critical role in the ongoing construction of national identity." 1 Id. at 36. He views his own 
version of "We the People" as making constitutional history a "revisionary narrative." 1 /d. 
at 44. 
51. See Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional Discourse and Its Discontents: An Essay on the 
Rhetoric of Judicial Review, in THE RHETORIC OF LAw 225, 234-50 (Austin Sarat & Thomas 
R. Keams eds., 1994). 
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of 'the People' ... as a kind of fictive entity constituted over time, 
in the life of the nation as a whole and in our institutions. "52 
More generally, White discusses Supreme Court opinions as lit-
erary works that rhetorically "construct" or "create" authority. The 
process by which judges create authority, it seems, is not essentially 
different from the process by which novelists or poets accomplish 
the same end. With respect to Justices like Frankfurter, Brandeis, 
and Harlan, White comments that "[t]he heart of their achievement 
lies in the recognition that their authority must be created rhetori-
cally, in the opinion itself."53 White's work is largely devoted to 
exploring the complex ways by which this rhetorical creation of au-
thority operates. 
E. Authority as Self-Fulfilling Fiction 
Despite the pedigree of the philosophers and scholars who in 
different ways trace political authority back to rhetoric or fiction, 
one may still harbor doubts. What is the point of constructing au-
thority on a :fictional level? Isn't labeling this authority "fictional" 
tantamount to admitting that it is "not real" - and therefore not 
helpful for addressing real-world legal and political issues? 
These questions may suggest that our quest for legal authority 
has again come to a dead end. At this point, though, the invocation 
of :fictions can be combined with Finnis's emphasis· on social neces-
sity plus effective power to suggest a more promising account of 
legal authority. The problem with Finnis's position, once again, was 
not that the position was implausible but rather that it left the cen-
tral question unanswered. Perhaps necessity plus power can create 
authority, but if power depends, as it typically does, on a wide-
spread belief that government has authority, we are still left won-
dering how that belief arises. 
Here the use of fictions may be illuminating. "Power" in the 
relevant sense consists, we might say, not in having actual a priori 
legal authority - whatever that might be - but in persuading a 
sufficient number of citizens that one has legal authority. If 
Napoleon can persuade the French that he has legal authority, then 
52. JAMES BoYD WHITE, Acrs oF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, 
AND POLITICS 84 (1994). White adds that "the idea that the framers of the Constitution, and 
the Constitution itself, are fictive is no argument against them. All thought about collective 
life requires simplification; all such thought is constitutive; and this 'fiction' ... has been at 
times a source of enormous good." Id. at 84 n.2. 
53. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 217 (1990). More generally, White 
explains: "There is no ground in nature, in the facts, or in uninterpreted texts, upon which 
the law and its authority can rest. Both law and authority are made, and largely made in the 
process of writing the opinions by which the decisions reached by courts are given their 
meaning." Id. 
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they will obey him, and he will thereby acquire power to satisfy the 
social need for coordination. 
In short, it is not fatal to legal authority to acknowledge that 
such authority is ultimately grounded in fiction.s4 If an authority 
story is believed, then it becomes in an important sense "true." If 
the people believe Napoleon has authority, he does; if they don't, 
he doesn't. The content of the authority story may vary - it may 
be a story about "divine right," or about a "social contract," or 
about a "community of principle" - but what matters is not the 
content of the story per se but rather that the story be believable 
and believed by those to whom it is addressed.ss 
III. THE NATURE OF FICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Recognizing the fictional element in legal authority may deflect 
some traditional and troublesome jurisprudential inquiries. In par-
ticular, this view suggests that the persistent quest to go beneath or 
beyond mere fictions such as "consent" or "social contract" in order 
to discover the "real" basis of legal obligation is, in one sense, un-
necessary and misguided. More generally, it seems that sociological 
questions of authority addressed by social theorists and philosophi-
cal questions of authority addressed by legal and political theorists 
are more intimately connected than some jurisprudential discus-
sions in an analytical philosophy mode seem to suppose. 
This view of legal authority as self-fulfilling fiction also suggests 
a different perspective, I will argue, on the problem of radically sub-
versive speech. Before returning to the free speech problem, how-
ever, it is necessary to reflect briefly on the nature of "fiction" and 
on the political "fictions" that may support authority. What does it 
mean to say of a story or a statement that it is a "fiction"? How are 
"fictions" different from simple "lies," on the one hand, and from 
simple "truths," on the other? And how do the fictions that lie at 
54. Fmnis concedes, although grudgingly, that legal authority might be grounded in a 
fiction: "The tendency of political thinkers to utter legalistic fictions about the original loca-
tion of authority has its excuse, and perhaps its occasion {but not a justification), in the ur-
gent need to legalize the devolution of undevolved authority." FINNIS, supra note 28, at 250. 
55. There may be a small flaw, or at least an unanswered question, in this account. Per-
haps the account is subtly parasitic. How could we have believable fictions about authority, a 
skeptic might ask, unless there were somewhere, perhaps in the backwaters of our memories, 
a "true" or "real" authority? We can have believable stories about fictional spies or fictional 
detectives, after all, because we know there are real spies and real detectives. But we treat 
stories about mermaids or dragons or genies differently - though of course we may still tell 
and enjoy them - because we are confident that mermaids and dragons and genies do not 
"really" exist. Perhaps the same is true for authority, and without "real" authority, we could 
not have even believable fictions about authority. Indeed, one might wonder how we could 
have even developed the concept of authority if authority were always and inherently fic-
tional. This doubt need not detain us, though, because, even if it is cogent, the important 
practical and jurisprudential question is still whether a particular account of authority is be-
lievable, not whether it is "true" in any more ultimate sense. 
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the foundation of legal authority work? This is not the place to 
explore these questions in detail, but it is necessary to say some-
thing about the kind of attitude or mindset that fictions seek to 
elicit and the conditions necessary to .sustain this attitude. 
A. The Fictional Mindset 
Consider first the sorts of :fictions with which we are all familiar 
and that we associate with the term "fiction": novels, movies, and 
television dramas. These fictions typically attempt to generate in 
the reader or viewer a complex, divided state of mind delicately 
poised between belief and disbelief.56 We may doubt that a novel 
or a television drama is "really true" - indeed, we may know that 
it is not historically accurate - but in order to enjoy or appreciate 
it, we need to be able to set aside that doubt and to take the story 
"as if" it were true.57 Suppose you go to a horror movie. If the film 
is well-made and if you maintain the appropriate attitude toward it, 
you will actually feel the terror the film is trying to evoke. For this 
to happen, you need to "believe" the story at least to the extent of 
imaginatively treating it "as if" it were true. A friend might mock 
you with the observation, "None of this really happened, you know; 
it's all made up." But your friend has missed the point and the 
experience by failing to muster up the requisite level of belief or by 
failing sufficiently to suspend his disbelief. His observation is su-
perfluous because, of course, even as you imaginatively take the 
story as true, you also remain cognizant at some level that it didn't 
"really happen." Indeed, if you believed it "really happened" in the 
way you might, for example, if the story appeared in a documentary 
or on the evening news, your reaction might be entirely different -
not the feeling of delicious terror that you have actually chosen and 
even paid to experience but perhaps a feeling of numbing fear, or 
shock, or outrage. 
If either of these conflicting attitudes - the belief or the disbe-
lief - is missing, then you will not have the experience of respond-
ing to the fiction in the appropriate or intended way. The story may 
56. For a helpful discussion of this complex mixture of belief and disbelief, see JAMES 
BOYD \VHITE, "THIS BOOK OF STARRES": LEARNING TO READ GEORGE HERBERT 42-44 
{1994). Cf. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND TIIE MODERN MINo 317 {1930) {"In the case of a 
fiction the mind is obliged to regard a subjective idea 'as if' it were objective but, at the same 
time, to remain aware that the idea is actually subjective."). 
57. Compare VINING, supra note 20, at 71: 
But then the individual who speaks in metaphor ... does perhaps want his listener 
actually to believe, if only part way, as a child may be both skeptical and believing at the 
same time, seeing Mole and Rat sitting in overstuffed armchairs inside a hollow tree in a 
forest, knowing they are not to be found there. The deceit is benign, it is play, it is 
fantasy in which everyone is to join with good to come of it in the end, a residue of 
understanding left behind as if understanding were precipitated out of good drink and 
then washed down with it. 
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be so implausible, or you may be so incorrigibly skeptical, that you 
simply cannot call up the requisite belief needed to engage with the 
story at all, and then you will not feel the horror - or the sadness, 
or the exhilaration- that the story attempts to evoke. Conversely, 
an inability to apply the proper measure of disbelief may reflect 
some cognitive or psychological deficiency. We may think it touch-
ing or endearing when someone cries quietly in a sad movie; if they 
wail inconsolably, we will think there is something a little wrong 
with them. That is not the reaction the story is supposed to pro-
duce. To be sure, in our academic mode, we may with a show of 
insight challenge the distinction between fact and :fiction.ss But if in 
everyday life, we encounter someone who persistently fails to dis-
tinguish between fiction and reality, we say they are "delusional" or 
that they live in "a fantasy world." 
Achieving and maintaining the complex attitude called for by a 
work of fiction requires effort both by the maker of the fiction and 
by the reader or viewer. The maker must present a story that is 
"plausible" in a complex sense. The story can deviate from actual 
history or from "the facts" in detectable ways, but if it seeks to be 
realistic fiction as opposed to, say, outright fantasy or theater of the 
absurd, it must not depart significantly from what "could have hap-
pened." In order to treat a story "as if" it were true, a reader or 
viewer should think that events of the kind narrated could have 
happened - even while acknowledging that they didn't - or that 
characters of the kind depicted could have existed and could have 
acted and talked in the way the story portrays. 
If the maker of the fiction must present something that is "plau-
sible," the viewer or reader must cooperate by trying to enter into 
the story and imaginatively take it as true, instead of warily watch-
ing for any sign of factual inaccuracy. It is merely obtuse or boorish 
to point out certain kinds of factual discrepancies in a work of :fic-
tion: "That's not really blood; it's ketchup!" or "Look! This is sup-
posed to be happening during the Truman administration, but 
notice that parked car. It's a 1954 Ford!" This kind of observation 
would be highly relevant in other contexts. In a murder trial, for 
example, it would be crucial to note that what had been described 
as blood was really ketchup or that what purported to be an authen-
tic photograph contained an object that did not exist at the time the 
photo was supposedly taken. With a fiction, however, this sort of 
trivial discrepancy is beside the point: the viewer's deficiency lies in 
noticing the discrepancy, not in failing to notice it. 
58. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 1-2 (1983) (arguing that the distinc-
tion between fact and fiction is often "questionable"). 
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B. The Payoff of Fiction 
Upon reflection about the nature of fictions, it becomes appar-
ent that the making and maintenance of fictions is a complex under-
taking on the part of both the maker and the reader or viewer. It is 
an undertaking that demands effort and imagination, and it can -
and, judging from movie reviews, usually_ does - go wrong in a 
variety of ways. What is it that justifies this effort and this risk? 
Substantially the same question is sometimes put by those who have 
no taste for novels or movies or television to those who do. Why 
waste time reading novels when you could read history and learn 
something true? Why watch television dramas when you could 
watch documentaries and thus become better informed? More gen-
erally, why should we make the effort to treat stories "as if" they 
were true when we know that in fact they aren't and when we could 
instead limit our attention to reports that at least purport to be 
factual? 
The answer is that fictions promise - and, when they are suc-
cessful, deliver - their own special kinds of payoff.59 In some 
cases, the payoff might be simply escape from the pain or drabness 
of everyday life. Or it might be entertainment. The payoff might 
be vicarious experience or mental, moral, or spiritual illumination. 
Rewards differ, but people make the effort that the production and 
appreciation of fictions requires because we hope to obtain some 
benefit or reward for our effort. 
So far we have been talking about the familiar kinds of fictions 
- novels, movies, and television shows. This discussion must now 
be extended to the political and legal fictions that lie at the founda-
tion of law's authority. 
C. Political Fictions 
Fictions about legal authority - about "social contracts" or 
"communities of principle" - demand at least as much imaginative 
effort and suspension of disbelief as novels or movies do. More-
over, legal fictions cannot promise payoffs in the form of entertain-
ment or enlightenment; people in need of either spiritual 
sustenance or comic relief typically do not tum to Hobbes or Locke 
or Dworkin or Rawls (although some readers may in fact find these 
authors spiritually sustaining - or comical). 
But fictions about legal authority offer an even more indispensa-
ble payoff, which is the one discussed by Finnis.60 In order to live 
together with a degree of harmony and cooperation, human beings 
need a coordinating authority. Political fictions seek to satisfy this 
59. See supra notes 52, 57. 
60. See supra section II.B. 
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need. Hence, powerful incentives support the effort to create and 
maintain viable fictions of authority. The compelling quality of 
these incentives may compensate, in the matter of political fictions, 
for even quite serious "factual" discrepancies. As a result, just as 
we may regard as obtuse the person who calls attention to the 1954 
Ford - and we will be especially inclined to do this if the film is a 
very entertaining or moving one - we may also regard as boorish 
the radical critic who insists on pointing out that no one has really 
signed a contract to support the government, and we will be espe-
cially inclined to do this if the government is functioning well in 
satisfying the need for social order. In each case, we may think, the 
critic has a point - but those who treat the critic with contempt 
have a more cogent point.61 
Despite the strength of the will to believe in political legitimacy, 
however, an authority story, like a novel or movie, still must satisfy 
some requirement of minimal plausibility. Three centuries ago, a 
claim of political authority based on "divine right" may have been 
sufficiently plausible; today, in this country, it just wouldn't sell. 
Even though voting in elections and exercising the right to speak 
about public issues may not add up to genuine and voluntary con-
sent to be subject to government, the fiction of consent is more be-
lievable where citizens can vote and speak their minds than where 
they cannot. In short, authority stories need not be exactly true, 
but they must be close enough to what is accepted as factual to 
sustain the sort of belief that fictions seek to elicit. 
This observation points to the real fl.aw in Dworkin's theory of 
legal authority. 62 The problem is not that his account depends upon 
a fiction but that Dworkin's fiction is not a very good one. Offered 
as an ostensible description of the polity of the United States or the 
United Kingdom or any other large and pluralistic democracy, 
Dworkin's rigorous "community of principle" partakes too much of 
fantasy to be accepted even as a plausible fiction. Indeed, it seems 
that in criticizing and seeking to replace the "consent" account of 
legal authority, Dworkin has misdiagnosed the situation and has of-
fered a nostrum that will only aggravate the malady. The problem 
with the "consent" account is not that it is conceptually inadequate. 
On the contrary, the notion that legitimate government may and 
must be based upon the consent of the governed still appears to 
61. Some of the reaction against the Critical Legal Studies movement and other critical 
movements in legal scholarship can be understood in this way - that is, as the protest of 
persons who believe that the legal order is functioning admirably or at least tolerably well 
and that it is therefore inappropriate for critics to upset the enterprise by emphasizing its 
defects and necessary illusions. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Law and Chivalry: An Exhor-
tation from the Spirit of the Hon. Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Pittsburgh (1748-1816), 53 U. 
PIIT. L. REv. 705, 741-42 {1992). 
62. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
November 1995] Subversive Speech 367 
command widespread support. The problem, if there is one, occurs 
on the factual level: it appears that citizens in reality have not 
meaningfully consented to government. As noted, Dworkin criti-
cizes the consent account on just this ground.63 But it is hardly a 
cure for this problem to offer an even more exotic fiction that on a 
factual level is as implausible as the consent account and that is 
conceptually alien as well. 
Indeed, once we recognize the fictional quality of legal author-
ity, it becomes quite unclear that any new theory of authority is 
needed. To the extent that there is any "legitimacy crisis," it seems 
that crisis arises not so much from conceptual deficiencies in the 
consent account as it does from practical problems that undermine 
its plausibility. When government undertakes to regulate more and 
more areas of life, for example, ·or when unelected judges assume a 
more pervasive supervisory role in the political and social order,64 
even citizens who are normally good-spirited or docile might natu-
rally be pressed to wonder when and how they have "consented" to 
these intrusions. In addition, if government increasingly comes to 
be seen as bloated or bumbling or wicked, the payoff that drives the 
effort to sustain the fiction of consent will diminish, thus threaten-
ing the viability of the fiction. But these difficulties do not demon-
strate any fl.aw in or erosion of support for the conceptual 
proposition that legitimate authority must be based on "consent." 
IV. THE FREE SPEECH PROBLEM REVISITED 
The immediately preceding discussion has considered the possi-
bility that conspicuous implausibilities in an authority-founding fic-
tion might threaten the legitimacy of government by undermining 
the belief needed to sustain the fiction. We must recall, though, 
that the state of mind that a fiction seeks to elicit is a complex one, 
involving not only belief but also a measure of disbelief, and that a 
failure to maintain the proper disbelief can also prevent the fiction 
from having the appropriate effect.65 On the individual level, a per-
63. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
64. Certainly it was the expanded role assumed by the judiciary beginning in the Warren 
Court era that prompted constitutional scholars to agonize over problems of "authority" and 
"legitimacy." The various constitutional writings of Alexander Bickel, Robert Bork, Ronald 
Dworkin, and Michael Perry, among many others, are centrally concerned with this issue. 
65. Thus, a number of scholars have argued that although legal fictions can serve valuable 
functions, "[a] fiction becomes wholly safe only when it is used with a complete consciousness 
of its falsity." FULLER, supra note 44, at 10. Conversely, if we forget that the fiction is a 
fiction, Lon Fuller warned, "the inevitable result is intellectual disaster." Id. at 119. In a 
similar vein, Jerome Frank argued that the "correct and effective use of a fiction involves a 
constant recognition of its character." Otherwise, the result is "confusion and befuddlement 
of thought," and the fiction is likely to become a dogma. FRANK, supra note 56, at 37-38, 317; 
see also Alf Ross, Legal Fictions, in LAW, REASON, AND JUSTICE 217, 219 (Graham Hughes 
ed., 1969) (discussing the dangers of ignoring the difference between what is fiction and what 
is real). 
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son who lacks the proper measure of disbelief in a fiction is "delu-
sional," and this kind of delusion is understood as a kind of 
psychological defect or mental illness. The malady that results from 
an analogous delusion on a societal level can have various names 
and take various forms. From a religious perspective, such a condi-
tion might be regarded as a form of political "idolatry."66 Speaking 
from a secular perspective, one might describe a political culture 
that believes too unreservedly in the authority of its law as "author-
itarian" or "oppressive."67 
If one reflects upon political history in this century or, more nar-
rowly, upon the views and assumptions of bureaucrats, judges, or 
"mainstream" legal scholars in this country at present, one might 
plausibly conclude that the authoritarian tendency to accept unre-
servedly the basic legitimacy of the existing legal order is as strong 
and potentially pernicious as the subversive temptation to deny the 
authority of law and government. Noticing that possibility brings 
this essay full circle to a second assessment of the issue of radically 
subversive speech. 
The fundamental objection to protecting radically subversive 
speech, once again, was that this kind of speech is necessarily 
"false" in a special sense.68 Though other statements might happen 
to be false, their truth or falsity raises a question independent of the 
truth or falsity of a theory or account of free speech. In contrast, 
insofar as radically subversive speech rejects assumptions on which 
a given theory of free speech rests, that theory seems logically com-
mitted to holding that the central message of such speech is false. 
Its necessary falsity, as opposed to the debatable and merely contin-
gent falsity of other kinds of speech, makes radically subversive 
speech a special problem for free speech theory. 
But the ensuing discussion of legal authority suggests that this 
earlier argument, although perhaps correct as far as it goes, is at 
best a partial truth. The legitimacy of the existing legal order, I 
have argued, is likely to be grounded in fiction, and an authority-
founding fiction, like others, calls upon citizens to exercise both be-
lief and disbelief. If the fiction works in the appropriate way, in 
other words, citizens should believe that government has legitimate 
authority - but also that it lacks such authority. More accurately, 
perhaps, the fiction should permit citizens to believe "as if" the 
necessary conditions for legal authority had been satisfied, even 
66. I have argued elsewhere that a good deal of modem constitutional interpretation can 
be understood as a form of idolatry. See Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 79 VA. L. REv. 583 (1993). 
67. For quite different efforts by legal scholars to explore the problem of authoritarianism 
in law, see JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986), and 
Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991). 
68. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
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though at another level they know that this belief is not "really 
true." 
Within the complex mindset required by the fiction of authority, 
radically subversive speech has an elusive, paradoxical status. Inso-
far as it denies something that the fiction calls upon citizens to be-
lieve, such speech is, to be sure, "false." But insofar as the 
authority story is a fiction, radically subversive speech is also true. 
Indeed, insofar as authority is grounded in a fiction, statements de-
nying the actual a priori legitimacy of government are, in an impor-
tant sense, necessarily true - unlike other kinds of statements that 
might be contingently true. So if a central purpose of legal protec-
tion for speech is to promote the pursuit of truth or to foster in 
citizens the appropriate orientation toward the legal order, then in 
one sense, radically subversive speech has a uniquely powerful 
claim on the law's protection.69 
For similar reasons, the earlier observation that radical critics of 
law's legitimacy are obtuse and boorish now needs to be amended. 
To be sure, radical critics can be simple-minded nay-sayers -
scorning a complex reality that they fail to grasp. But this is at best 
only half of the story. In another sense, radical critics are uncom-
monly perceptive; they tell a truth that most of us habitually over-
look and that we need to be reminded of, lest we become 
"delusional" or "idolatrous." The radicals' message is "false" as 
measured by the fiction that we need to believe, but it is true in 
pointing out what we also need to recognize: the fictional quality of 
our beliefs.70 
V. A CONCLUDING DOUBT - AND AFFIRMATION 
I have suggested in this essay that the key to understanding both 
radically subversive speech and legal authority lies in the capacity 
of a class of statements or stories - "fictions" - to be both "true" 
and "false" and hence to call upon us to exercise both belief and 
disbelief. Insofar as we accept the claims of legal authority as 
"true,'' radically subversive speech is "false." But insofar as legal 
authority is grounded in fiction, the central claim of radically sub-
versive speech is true. 
69. Whether such speech should be protected in every circumstance and in all of its mani-
festations is a question that I think cannot be answered on the basis of these reflections 
alone. That should not be surprising. Particular legal decisions and doctrines can almost 
never simply be deduced from abstract theory. Earlier in the essay, I suggested that pruden-
tial reasons might counsel protection for radically subversive speech even if in theory that 
speech is undeserving of protection. Conversely, prudence may sometimes require regulation 
of radically subversive speech even though there is a good theoretical objection to such 
regulation. 
70. For a related argument suggesting that art should receive full constitutional protec-
tion because it is a valuable source of subversion, see Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, V AND. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 18-20, on file with author). 
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Still, one may wonder whether fictional claims of legal authority 
can meaningfully be compared to more familiar fictions like televi-
sion dramas and novels. With ordinary fictions we can mediate be-
lief and disbelief in temporal fashion: during the movie or while 
reading the novel, we can treat it as true, and afterward, we can call 
it a fiction. But our experience of legal and political authority is not 
structured in this way. Typically there is no relevant afterward in 
which we look back upon legal authority and call it a fiction. Con-
versely, once we do assert that legal authority is founded in fiction, 
how can we thereafter continue to treat that authority as if it were 
"real"? To call a statement or story "fiction," after all, is normally 
to call attention to the statement's or the story's lack of truth. 
I will not try to solve this problem but only to deflect it with a 
further observation. In this essay, I have discussed two kinds of 
claims - those of radically subversive speech and of legal authority 
- while proceeding as if my own discussion were detached, some-
how independent of and different than the kinds of claims it is stud-
ying. But of course this essay is not unlike the subjects of its 
discussion. Insofar as it calls attention to the fictional quality of 
authority, it is itself a kind of subversive speech; insofar as it claims 
that authority can be based on fiction, it offers a version of and 
provides support for legal authority. So the essay, it seems, shares 
the ambiguous quality of the claims it discusses, and it accordingly 
calls for the same mixture of belief and disbelief. Authority exists 
insofar as we treat the kind of claims made in this essay as "false." 
As with other subversive speech, though, it would be a mistake to 
forget that its claims are also true. 
